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1
CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION:  A COLLECTIVE ACTION PERSPECTIVE ON 
FEDERALISM CONSIDERATIONS 
 




 The longer Congress dithers and stumbles in its efforts to pass climate change 
legislation aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions, the greater will be the need for 
the adoption and implementation of climate change adaptation measures.  As the 
Congressional Budget Office has recognized, “[t]he world is committed to some degree 
of warming from emissions that have already occurred, and even very aggressive 
emissions restrictions are unlikely to halt the growth of concentrations for many years to 
come.”1  Most climate change scientists seem to agree.2  Although the exact nature, 
extent, and distribution of the adverse effects of climate change is unknowable, the 
climate change to which the world is already committed threatens to transform natural 
ecosystems and disrupt human social and economic systems that rely on them, perhaps to 
an unprecedented degree and within a relatively short time period.3  According to the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the expected impacts of climate 
change include melting of glaciers, intensifying droughts and runoff, rising sea levels, 
and changes in the morphology, physiology, phenology, reproduction, species 
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1
 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, UNCERTAINTY IN ANALYZING CLIMATE CHANGE: POLICY IMPLICATIONS 36 
(2005) [hereafter CBO]. 
2
 See Hari M. Osofsky, Is Climate Change “International”? Litigation’s Diagonal Regulatory Role, 49 VA. 
J. INT’L L. 585, 598 (2009) (citing INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 
2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY: CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE FOURTH 
ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE IPCC (2007), available at http:// www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4-wg2.htm) 
(“The Fourth [Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change] Report makes it clear that we have passed the 
point at which prevention of impacts is possible . . . and scientific consensus suggests that they will only 
get worse as time passes.”) [hereafter IPCC ADAPTATION REPORT].  See also Alejandro E. Camacho, 
Adapting Governance to Climate Change: Managing Uncertainty Through A Learning Infrastructure, 59 
EMORY L.J. 1, 17 (2009) (stating that “no amount of abatement, even if enacted tomorrow, is likely to 
diminish the effects of climate change for several decades.  Evidence suggests that the effects of global 
warming are already being experienced in the United States, and climate change is likely to continue for 
decades, even in the event of significant reduction of emissions.”); Robin Kundis Craig, “Stationarity is 
Dead”—Long Live Transformation: Five Principles for Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 9, 14 (2010) (“Because of ‘committed’ warming — climate change that will occur 
regardless of the world's success in implementing mitigation measures, a result of the already accumulated 
greenhouse gases (‘GHGs’) in the atmosphere — what happens to socio-ecological systems over the next 
decades, and most likely over the next few centuries, will largely be beyond human control.”).  Consensus 
about the link between anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions and climate change, and about whether 
climate change poses immediate and unacceptable threats is not universal.  The purpose of this article is not 
to rehash the scientific debate.  Rather, it is to consider how policymakers committed to preparing society 
for what they regard as the unavoidable, anticipated adverse effects of climate change should structure a 
climate change adaptation policy in light of federalism considerations. 
3
 See Camacho, supra note 2, at 13. 
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2
distribution, community structure, ecosystem processes and species evolutionary 
processes among marine, freshwater, and terrestrial biological systems.4 
 
 The buildup of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere that has already 
occurred5 and the likely growth in future emissions due to increased energy consumption 
in developing nations such as China and India,6 has convinced many scientists and 
policymakers that society needs to begin developing policies that will allow adaptation to 
climate change in ways that minimize its adverse effects.7  While effort to mitigate 
climate change entail reducing emissions of GHGs and lowering their concentrations in 
the atmosphere, adaptation, according to the IPCC, involves “adjustment in natural or 
human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which 
moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities.”8  In other words, “[w]hile 
mitigation in response to climate change primarily represents activities to protect nature 
from society, adaptation constitutes ways of protecting society from nature.”9 
 
 Climate change adaptation is designed to increase the resilience of natural and 
human ecosystems to the threats posed by a changing environment.  Resilience, in turn, 
can be viewed as “the ability of a system to return to its initial state and function in spite 
                                                 
4
 IPCC ADAPTATION REPORT, supra note 2, at § 1.5, 
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg2/en/ch1s1-5.html.   For further description of some of 
the potential adverse physical, biological, and socio-economic effects of climate change, see Robert L. 
Glicksman, Ecosystem Resilience to Disruptions Linked to Global Climate Change: An Adaptive Approach 
to Federal Land Management, 87 NEB. L. REV. 833, 839-51 (2009). 
5
 According to the World Meteorological Organization, global concentrations of CO2 reached record highs 
in 2005 — 381.2 parts per million.  See WORLD METEOROLOGICAL ORGANIZATION, GREENHOUSE GAS 
BULLETIN: THE STATE OF GREENHOUSE GASES IN THE ATMOSPHERE USING GLOBAL OBSERVATIONS 
THROUGH 2006 (2007), available at http://www.wmo.ch/pages/mediacentre/news/index_en.html.  
According to a study published in 2007, the growth rate of atmospheric CO2 is increasing rapidly as a result 
of recent growth of the world economy, rapid growth in fossil fuel CO2 emissions since 2000, and a long-
term (50-year) increase in the airborne fraction of CO2 emissions.  The last finding implies a decline in the 
efficiency of CO2 sinks on land and oceans in absorbing anthropogenic emissions.  The authors concluded 
that the magnitude of the airborne fraction appears larger than that estimated by models.  As a result, the 
carbon cycle is generating stronger-than-expected and sooner-than-expected climate forcing.  Josep G. 
Canadell et al., Contributions to Accelerating Atmospheric CO2 Growth from Economic Activity, Carbon 
Intensity, and Efficiency of Natural Sinks, 104 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. OF SCI. 10288 (Oct. 25, 2007). 
6
 See, e.g., Keith Bradsher, China’s Energy Use Threatens Goals on Warming, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2010  
(noting that China’s “surging demand for power from oil and coal has led to the largest six-month increase 
in the tonnage of human generated greenhouse gases ever by a single country”);  India’s GHG Emissions 
Up by 58 Per Cent, SCIDEV NET (May 12, 2010), http://www.scidev.net/en/climate-change-and-
energy/india-s-ghg-emissions-up-by-58-per-cent-1.html  (reporting that India’s GHG emissions rose by 58 
per cent between 1994 and 2007). 
7
 See, e.g., IPCC ADAPTATION REPORT, supra note 2, at § 17.5 (suggesting “that a high priority should be 
given to increasing the capacity of countries, regions, communities and social groups to adapt to climate 
change in ways that are synergistic with wider societal goals of sustainable development”), 
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg2/en/ch17s17-5.html. 
8
 Id. at 6. 
9
 Stine Aakre & Dirk T.G. Rübbelke, Adaptation to Climate Change in the European Union Efficiency vs. 
Equity Considerations, CEPS Working Document No. 301/September 2008, at 2-3, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1275262&download=yes. 
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of some major perturbation,”10 or “the amount of change or disturbance that a system can 
absorb before it undergoes a fundamental shift to a different set of processes and 
structures.”11  Professor Robin Craig has summarized the IPCC’s call for the 
development of adaptation capacity as follows: 
 
[T]he IPCC noted that “[a]daptation is necessary in the short and longer term to 
address impacts resulting from the warming that would occur even for the lowest 
stabilisation scenarios assessed.”   In other words, adaptation must become a co-
strategy with mitigation efforts for dealing with climate change, because “[r]isks 
associated with climate change could greatly increase vulnerability unless 
adaptation is stepped up.”  Moreover, adaptation efforts may have immediate 
benefits for socio-ecological systems by decreasing vulnerability to future 
changes, “reducing sensitivity to climatic risks,” and increasing the adaptive 
capacity of both humans and the ecological systems upon which they depend.12 
 
 Despite the critical need for the development of adaptive responses to climate 
change, the federal government has done almost nothing to stake out its turf on 
adaptation policy or to coordinate the responses of lower levels of government.13  This 
article takes the need for the development of an effective adaptation policy as a given14 
and focuses on the proper allocation of decisionmaking authority within our federal 
system of government.  While much has been written about the federalism implications 
of climate change mitigation policy,15 relatively less has been written about the 
federalism issues arising from climate change adaptation policy.16  This disproportionate 
                                                 
10
 U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE PROGRAM & THE SUBCOMM. ON GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH, 
PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF ADAPTATION OPTIONS FOR CLIMATE-SENSITIVE ECOSYSTEMS AND RESOURCES 9-
16 (2008), http://www.climatescience.gov/Library/sap/sap4-4/default.php. 
11
 Id. at 2. 
12
 Craig, supra note 2, at 21 (quoting INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE 
CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT: SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 19 (2007)). 
13
 See J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation and the Structural Transformation of Environmental Law, 40 
ENVTL. L. 363, 409 (2010) (stating that “the United States has compiled close to zero in the way of 
coordinated anticipatory adaptation policy for managing the risk in the United States of climate change 
catastrophe and crisis”). 
14
 See supra note 2. 
15
 See, e.g., Symposium, Federalism and Climate Change: The Role of the States in a Future Federal 
Regime, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 673-938 (2008); Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 
NW. U. L. REV. 1097 (2009); Kirsten Engel, State and Local Climate Change Initiatives: What Is 
Motivating State and Local Governments to Address a Global Problem and What Does This Say About 
Federalism and Environmental Law?, 38 URB. LAW. 1015 (2006); Robert L. Glicksman & Richard E. 
Levy, A Collective Action Perspective on Ceiling Preemption by Federal Environmental Regulation: The 
Case of Global Climate Change, 102 N.W. U. L. REV. 579 (2008); Alice Kaswan, A Cooperative 
Federalism Proposal for Climate Change Legislation: The Value of State Autonomy in a Federal System, 
85 DENV. U. L. REV. 791 (2008). 
16
 See Daniel A. Farber, Climate Adaptation and Federalism: Mapping the Issues, UC Berkeley Public Law 
Research Paper No. 1468621, at 1, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1468621 [hereafter 
Farber, Mapping] (“There is a vigorous debate about the appropriate roles of the state and federal 
government in reducing greenhouse gases and mitigating climate change.  There has been little if any 
discussion, however, about the appropriate roles of the states and the federal government in adapting to 
climate change.”)  Cf. Daniel A. Farber, Adapting to Climate Change: Who Should Pay?, 23 J. LAND USE 
& ENVTL. L. 1, 2 (2007)  (“Adaptation has been a neglected topic, in part because mitigation seems more 
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emphasis on mitigation is not because the problems facing adaptation policymakers are 
any simpler than those relating to adaptation, or because the government is further along 
in devising solutions.  President Obama’s Interagency Climate Change Task Force has 
posited that that “[a]daptation and resilience will require action from all segments of 
society — the public sector, the nonprofit sector and individuals.  This challenge provides 
Federal, Tribal, State, and local governments with significant opportunities for 
innovation.”17  The Task Force also stated that significant gaps in the U.S. government’s 
approach to climate change adaptation and building resilience exist, including the 
absence of a unified strategic vision and approach, an understanding of the challenges at 
all levels of government, and an organized and coordinated effort among federal, state, 
local, and tribal actors.18 
 
 One argument for devolving considerable control over the formulation and 
implementation of adaptation policy to the state and local levels is that the effects of 
climate change will vary by location, requiring different strategies.19  If a “one size fits 
all” approach was ill-suited to pollution control regimes,20 it is likely to be that much 
more problematic when addressing climate change adaptation issues.  Accordingly, some 
have advocated placing the power and responsibility pf dealing with adaptation issues 
principally in the hands of local governments.21  The German federal government has 
accepted this view, postulating that “[p]eople on the spot often know what is good for 
                                                                                                                                                 
urgent, and in part for political reasons. The political reason is a fear by environmentalists that discussing 
possible adaptive measures might undermine the political pressure for mitigation.). 
17
 Interagency Climate Change Task Force, Progress Report of the Interagency Climate Change Adaptation 
Task Force, at 1 (Mar. 16, 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ceq/20100315-
interagency-adaptation-progress-report.pdf.  
18
 Id. at 3-4. 
19
 See Craig, supra note 2, at 25.  The same is true at the global level.  See id. at 23 (stating that “a global 
legal response is insufficient to deal with the localized details of climate change impacts, which will require 
legal reforms at the national, state, and local levels as well.”). 
20
 See, e.g., Timothy F. Malloy, The Social Construction of Regulation: Lessons from the War Against 
Command and Control, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 267, 269 (2010)  (describing uncritical acceptance of the premise 
that “[i]nnovation is stifled, and pollution management is dominated by a one-size-fits-all approach 
developed by the uninformed, centralized regulatory agency”).  Cf. Carol M. Rose, From H2O to CO2: 
Lessons of Water Rights for Carbon Trading, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 91, 92 (2008)  (“The older command-and-
control regulatory systems have certainly had an important impact on pollution reduction, in the United 
States as elsewhere, but their rigidity and one-size-fits-all character make them seem expensive and old-
fashioned by comparison to more nimble, innovative and cost-sensitive market approaches.”); Richard B. 
Stewart, United States Environmental Regulation: A Failing Paradigm, 15 J.L. & COM. 585, 587-88 (1996) 
(“In order to economize on decision-making costs, regulators adopt uniform measures of procrustean 
character that are often inappropriate for particular facilities. [FN10] Command and control regulation also 
creates enormous economic waste by failing to equalize the marginal costs of control of the same pollutant 
across different sources. Uniform “one size  fits all” requirements are adopted for categories of industrial 
facilities, ignoring large variations in the costs of control among different facilities within the same 
category.”). 
21
 See, e.g., REBECCA CARTER & SUSAN CULP, PLANNING FOR CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE WEST 24 (Lincoln 
Inst. of Land Policy 2010) (“Counties, cites, and towns are also the most appropriate level of government to 
tackle the adaptation actions that must take place to climate-proof communities.”). 
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their specific case.  The Federal Government is therefore relying on strengthening 
individual capacity and adaptive capacity at the local level.”22 
 
 On the other hand, federal participation and leadership is likely to be necessary 
for several reasons.  State and local authorities may lack the resources to lead the 
adaptation effort, they are likely to have incentives to put their citizens at a disadvantage 
vis-à-vis those of other jurisdictions fighting for scarce resources such as water, the 
actions of one jurisdiction may have adverse spillover effects in other places, and 
coordination of the policies of multiple jurisdictions may be needed to ensure 
effectiveness.23  These have long been the justifications offered for affording a prominent 
role to the federal government in many environmental regulatory programs.  As one 
observer has noted, “[f]ederal systems always seem to face substantial pressure to 
devolve implementing policy choices to the local level. On the other hand, joint action is 
the raison d'être for federalism, and hence, the lines of authority must facilitate unity.”24 
 
 My aim in this article is to provide a framework for determining how to structure 
a policy to facilitate adaptation to climate change that assigns appropriate roles to all 
levels of government.  The framework emerges from analysis of several questions.  First, 
when is participation by the federal government appropriate?  Second, should the federal 
government set a floor that requires participation by, or at least conformance with federal 
requirements, by states and localities?  Third, should the federal government ever 
displace state and local adaptation responses based on the threats those responses pose to 
federal interests?  In other words, the article inquires whether climate change adaptation 
policy should be a thoroughly state or local affair with no federal participation, a 
cooperative venture in which all three levels of government lend a hand, or an 
exclusively federal regime.  The obvious answer is that some aspects of adaptation policy 
should be controlled exclusively by state and localities, some should be governed by 
cooperative federalism ventures, and still others should be exclusively within the control 
of the federal government.  The real issue is which aspects of the need to adapt to climate 
change should be governed by each of these three possible relationships. 
 
 I argue that collective action principles provide a useful tool for determining the 
proper institutional arrangements for dealing with climate change adaptation.  Part II of 
the article examines three models for structuring the relationship between federal, state, 
and local actors in preparing for the onset of the adverse effects of climate change.  
Under the first model, the federal government provides information or funding to states 
and localities, who may use that information and those resources to craft their own 
adaptation policies free of federal intervention and control.  A variation of that model, in 
which the federal government retains greater control, attaches conditions to the receipt of 
                                                 
22
 FEDERAL MINISTRY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, NATURE CONSERVATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY, 
COMBATING CLIMATE CHANGE: THE GERMAN ADAPTATION STRATEGY 9 (Mar. 2009) [hereafter GERMAN 
ADAPTATION]. 
23
 See, e.g., Farber, Mapping, supra note  16, at 2 (“The states are likely to play the leading role in 
adaptation, but federal intervention may be warranted by the existence of interstate spillover effects, 
political distortions that hinder state responses, or equitable factors.”). 
24
 Charles H. Koch, Jr., The Devolution of Implementing Policymaking in Network Governments, 57 
EMORY L.J. 167, 174 (2007). 
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federal funds.  The second model is the traditional cooperative federalism model that 
characterizes much of federal environmental law under statutes such as the Clean Air 
Act.  The third model involves federal preemption of particular aspects of state and local 
adaptation policy.  Part II also briefly addresses whether federal, state, and local roles 
should differ in the contexts of climate change mitigation and adaptation policy, given 
that adaptation measures in some instances will affect areas of the law (such as water and 
land use law) in which policy traditionally has been set primarily at the state and local 
levels. 
 
 Part III applies collective action principles to climate change adaptation policy as 
an aid to deciding on the appropriate allocation of decisionmaking authority among 
governments.  Subpart A explains the function of collective action analysis and then 
identifies the five traditionally recognized collective action justifications for the federal 
government’s participation in determining environmental policy.  In the next subpart, I 
inquire whether any of these justifications support setting federal floors to counter state 
and local inaction or the adoption by these levels of government of inadequate adaptation 
measures.  I conclude that the presence of transboundary externalities and race-to-the-
bottom considerations are the most likely justifications for establishment of a federal 
floor, and that the use of conditional funding or cooperative federalism arrangements may 
be used to avoid excessive intrusion on state and local discretion.  Subpart C considers 
whether collective actions principles ever justify preemption of “excessive” or wrong-
headed state or local activity in response to the threats posed by climate change.  I 
conclude that while most of the collective action justifications for a federal presence in 
environmental law are not likely to justify preemption of state and local adaptation 
measures, the possibility of transboundary externalities, the need for uniformity, and the 
proclivity of state and localities to foist problems arising from climate change on other 
jurisdictions  may do so in limited instances. 
 
II. THE DESIGN OF FEDERAL CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION POLICY 
 
 The options for the design of a federal policy for climate change adaptation range 
from affording state and local governments broad discretion to determine the nature of 
their responses, to divesting state and local power in favor of exclusive federal control.  
The appropriate option may differ depending on the strength of federal, state, and local 
interests in, the traditional allocation of decisionmaking authority over, and the nature of 
the collective action problem implicated by the various resources and activities affected 
by climate change.  The institutional considerations and federalism concerns are not 
necessarily the same for climate change adaptation as for mitigation policy.  In particular, 
they may tilt more heavily on favor of an expansive role for state and localities in the 
adaptation context. 
 
A. Models of Adaptation Federalism 
 
The allocation of power among the federal government and state and localities to 
determine the nature of governmental responses to the anticipated or actual effects of 
climate change can follow one of three models.  First, the federal role could be confined 
__ ENVTL. L. ___ (2011) (forthcoming) 
   
 
7
to developing and providing information or providing financial support for actions 
designed and implemented by state and local governments.  The federal government 
could retain greater control while still leaving implementation authority primarily in state 
or local hands by conditioning the receipt of federal funds on adherence to federal 
standards or policies.  Second, Congress could choose to follow the traditional 
cooperative federalism model in fashioning a climate change adaptation regime by setting 
goals, but delegating to the states the primary authority to achieve them through means 
selected by the states.  Third, federal authority could displace state or local power, at least 
over certain aspects of the adaptation effort. 
 
The first model is the one Congress used in the initial stages of the modern 
environmental area.  Congress during the 1960s enacted legislation into the causes and 
effects of pollution, for example, but depended on the states to use that information to 
control the sources of pollution that created health and environmental risks. It also 
provided financial support for state regulatory efforts.25  Under the Clean Water Act, for 
example, EPA has administered a program of grants and loans to state and local 
governments for the construction of sewage treatment plants.26  To this day, the federal 
environmental laws identify these kinds of information and resource-sharing efforts as 
critical statutory purposes.  The Clean Air Act, for example, includes among its purposes 
the initiation and acceleration of a national research and development program to prevent 
and control air pollution, and the provision of technical and financial assistance to state 
and local governments to develop and execute their air pollution prevention and control 
programs.27  Other environmental statutes reflect similar goals.28  Although the federal 
role in controlling air and water pollution has moved well beyond providing federal 
technical and financial support to state and local programs,29 federal statutes specifically 
directed at climate change to date focus on information gathering and distribution, not 
regulatory action.30  Other nations with federal systems have concluded that an 
appropriate role for the federal government is supplying information on climate change 
adaptation to lower level units of government.31 
 
                                                 
25
 See Robert L. Glicksman, From Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism:  The Perverse Mutation of 
Environmental Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719, 730 (2006); Glicksman & Levy, supra note 
15, at 596. 
26
 33 U.S.C. §§ 1281-1301 (2006).  See also id. §§ 1255-1260 (providing grants for various water pollution 
control programs). 
27
 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(2)-(3) (2006). 
28
 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a)(1), (9) (2006) (Resource Conservation and Recovery Act); 33 U.S.C. § 
1251(b) (2006) (Clean Water Act). 
29
 See Glicksman, supra note 25, at 737-40. 
30
 E.g., 7 U.S.C. §§ 6701-6711 (2006); 15 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2903, 2931-2938 (2006); 16 U.S.C. § 
1601(a)(5)-(6) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 10366 (2006); 42 U.S.C. §§ 13381-13389 (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 16293 
(2006).  The Supreme Court has interpreted the Clean Air Act, however,  to vest in EPA the authority to 
regulate GHG emissions.  Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).  EPA has begun to exercise that 
authority.  See, e.g., EPA, Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average 
Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010); EPA Prevention of Significant 
Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010). 
31
 See, e.g., GERMAN ADAPTATION, supra note 22, at 51 (“To enable federal, [state] and local authorities to 
take a systematic approach to the adaptation issue, they need a common basis of methods, data and 
information about climate change, the expected consequences and the effects already observed.”). 
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One way to increase the federal government’s role in the development of climate 
change adaptation strategies without displacing state and local authorities as the primary 
policymaking bodies would be to use Congress’ authority under the Spending Clause32 to 
condition the provision of federal funds for adaptation planning on compliance with 
federal standards or criteria.33  In particular, federal funding could be conditioned on 
compliance with adaptation strategies that do not interfere with federal purposes or 
damage the national interest.  This approach would leave state and local governments 
with the option of choosing not to follow the federal lead if they are willing to forego 
federal financial assistance.34  Some of the major climate change bills considered by 
Congress during 2009-2010 would have conditioned federal funds for adaptation 
planning in this way.35  The federal government could condition the receipt of federal 
flood insurance, funding for infrastructure projects, and agricultural subsidies, among 
other things, on the willingness of states and localities to comply with federal adaptation 
planning procedures and criteria.36 
 
A second model, which would increase the extent to which the federal 
government controls the design and implementation of climate adaptation policy without 
ousting state or local exercises of power, is the cooperative federalism model reflected in 
the major federal pollution control statutes such as the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts.37  
In those contexts, cooperative federalism involves shared governmental responsibility for 
                                                 
32
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
33
 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (describing the scope of Congress’s authority to impose 
conditions on the receipt of federal funds).  See generally Denis Binder, The Spending Clause as a Positive 
Source of Environmental Protection, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 147 (2001); Terry Jean Seligman, Muddy Waters: 
The Supreme Court and the Clear Statement Rule for Spending Clause Legislation, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1067 
(2010). 
34
 See, e.g., Damien Leonard, Raising the Levee: Dutch Land Use Law as a Model for U.S. Adaptation to 
Climate Change, 21 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 543, 561 (2009) (urging the attachment of explicit 
conditions to federal funding of state and local adaptation planning efforts). 
35
 See, e.g., American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. §§ 479-480 
(conditioning funding from Natural Resources Climate Change Adaptation Fund on state or tribal 
preparation of natural resources adaptation plan to address impacts of climate change and ocean 
acidification on fish, wildlife, plants, habitats, ecosystems, wildlife health, ecological processes, and the 
coastal zone); Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, S. 1733, 111th Cong. § 383 (2009) 
(conditioning receipt of cost-share grants to assist in wildfire protection practices on fulfillment of 
requirements concerning cooperative fire agreements, community wildfire protection plan, and other 
collaborative processes). 
36
 See Farber, Mapping, supra note 16, at 8. 
37
 The dividing line between a regime based on information sharing and conditional federal funding, and 
the cooperative federalism model described here is not always clear.  The Coastal Zone Management Act, 
16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1466 (2006), involves both conditional federal funding and state implementation of 
federally devised criteria for protecting coastal zones from development.  See Leonard, supra note 34, at 
557 (stating that the Coastal Zone Management Act encourages a “brand of inter-governmental 
cooperation” that involves federal establishment of broad criteria, but recognizes that “the implementation 
of those criteria must occur on the state and local level to address the unique needs of that jurisdiction.  For 
those states that choose to carry out the federal program, there is federal funding and technical assistance 
available.”).  Moreover, as indicated above, statutes such as the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts, which are 
the most prominent examples of cooperative federalism in U.S. environmental law, authorize information 
sharing and federal financial assistance. 
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achieving federally prescribed environmental protection goals.38  Under the Clean Air 
Act, for example, the federal government retains the authority to set national ambient air 
quality standards,39 delegates to the states the authority to achieve those standards 
through the preparation of implementation plans which must be approved by EPA,40 
allows states to administer the permit program through which emission controls are 
applied to individual sources,41 requires sources to comply with federal technology-based 
standards such as those that apply to new stationary sources42 or sources of hazardous air 
pollutants43 but allows states to adopt more stringent standards,44 and shares enforcement 
authority with the states.45  Some European nations, including the Netherlands, have 
created climate change adaptation strategies that build on the cooperative federalism 
model.46 
 
A third model involves displacement of state and local authority to devise and 
implement climate change adaptation policy.  Such preemption of state and local 
authority is rare in the federal environment laws.47  Most statutes explicitly preserve state 
                                                 
38
 Professors Adelman and Engel have described cooperative federalism as follows: 
In its simplest form, cooperative federalism is a system of shared authority between the federal 
and state governments.  Typically, Congress delegates broad regulatory authority to a federal 
agency (such as standards setting, enforcement, and permitting) and authorizes the agency to 
delegate program implementation  to states that satisfy certain requirements.  An important 
requirement is that state programs adopt environmental standards at least as stringent as the federal 
program.  Further, to ensure adequate state implementation, the federal government retains 
oversight authority. This residual authority enables the federal government to bring enforcement 
actions within a delegated state and to unilaterally withdraw a state’s delegated powers for failing 
to meet federal standards. 
David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, The Case Against Reallocating Environmental Regulatory 
Authority, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1796, 1811-12 (2008).  For a more expansive discussion of the elements of 
cooperative federalism in the federal pollution control and natural resource management statutes, see 
Glicksman, supra note 25, at 737-47.  Other variations are possible.  See, e.g., A. Dan Tarlock, Federalism 
Without Preemption: A Case Study in Bioregionalism, 27 PAC. L.J. 1629, 1651 (1996) (describing a model 
of “partnership federalism” which “allows state and local governments to define the content of federal 
mandates” through mechanisms such as multiparty agreements and federal waivers of power); Erin Ryan, 
Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1583132 (describing various methods by which state 
and federal authorities bargain concerning federalism issues); Kirsten Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of 
Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159 (2006) (describing version of cooperative 
federalism based on presumptively concurrent federal and state power). 
39
 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408-7409 (2006). 
40
 Id. § 7410. 
41
 Id. § 7661a(d). 
42
 Id. § 7411. 
43
 Id. § 7412. 
44
 Id. § 7416.  State authority to adopt and apply more stringent standards controlling emissions from motor 
vehicles is more restricted.  Id. § 7543.  See infra notes 49-51 and accompanying text. 
45
 42 U.S.C. § 7413 (2006).  For a description of state authority and responsibilities under the Clean Water 
Act, see Glicksman, supra note 25, at 741-42. 
46
 See Leonard, supra note 34, at 548-49 (describing decentralized model in which regional and local 
governments determine land use policy, but “must take national concerns such as water management, 
environment, cultural heritage, and landscape into account when developing their plans”). 
47
 See William W. Buzbee, Federal Floors, Ceilings, and the Benefits of Federalism’s Institutional 
Diversity, in PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM’S CORE QUESTION 98 
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authority to adopt standards that are more stringent than the federal floor.48  In rare 
instances, however, Congress has barred the states from adopting standards or other 
regulatory approaches that differ from federal standards in any way.  The most important 
example is the Clean Air Act’s prohibition on adoption by the states of motor vehicle 
emission standards that differ from EPA’s standard.49  Congress carved out an exception 
from that prohibition for California because of the severity of its air pollution problems 
and the fact that it began regulating motor vehicle emissions before Congress adopted the 
Clean Air Act.50  If EPA waives the prohibition on state standards for California, other 
states may adopt standards equivalent to California’s.51  In similar fashion, Congress 
could decide that the federal government should retain exclusive (or near-exclusive) 
control over certain aspects of climate change adaptation policy. 
 
B. Mitigation and Adaptation Compared 
 
It is unlikely that the same model is appropriate for all aspects of federal climate 
change adaptation policy.  A federal information-sharing role may be best suited to some 
aspects, while others would accommodate conditional funding or traditional cooperative 
federalism arrangements.  Even displacement of state and local authority may be 
appropriate in some areas.  Some participants in debate over climate change mitigation 
legislation have advocated displacement of state cap-and-trade programs for reducing 
GHG emissions.52  Regardless of whether Congress decides to preempt state cap-and 
trade programs, the considerations that bear on whether to preempt state and local 
measures relating to climate change mitigation policy are not necessarily the same as 
those relevant to the role of the states and localities in adapting to climate change.53   
 
Some of the analysis of whether the federal government should preempt state and 
local efforts to abate GHG emissions is likely to be applicable to analysis of adaptation 
federalism questions, too.  As Professor Robin Craig has noted, for example, pollution 
control laws bear on adaptation as well as mitigation because a reduction in some forms 
of pollution will reduce ecological stressors and thus enhance ecosystem resilience to 
                                                                                                                                                 
(William W. Buzbee ed., 2009) (asserting that “ceiling preemption,” which involves precluding states from 
adopting standards that are more stringent than federal standards, are uncommon in environmental law). 
48
 E.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (2006) (Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 6929 (2006) (Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (Clean Air Act (2006).  Professor Buzbee has explained that provisions 
such as these that establish federal floors “preclude any more lax regulatory choices by state or local 
governments,” but allow states and localities to impose more stringent controls through regulation or 
common law standards.  Buzbee, supra note 47, at 98. 
49
 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2006). 
50
 Id. § 7543(b); Glicksman & Levy, supra note 15, at 627. 
51
 42 U.S.C. § 7507 (2006). 
52
 See, e.g., Alice Kaswan, A Cooperative Federalism Proposal for Climate Change Legislation: The Value 
of State Autonomy in a Federal System, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 791 (2008); Yvonne Gross, Kyoto, Congress, 
or Bust: The Constitutional Invalidity of State CO2 Cap-and-Trade Programs, 28 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 
205 (2005); Glicksman & Levy, supra note 15, at 642-47. 
53
 See, e.g., Craig, supra note 2, at 39 (arguing that “policymakers, courts, and regulators should 
acknowledge that mitigation law and adaptation law address separate, if ultimately related, regulatory 
problems and need different sets of tools to do so”). 
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climate change.54  Two aspects of climate change adaptation policy, however, suggest 
that preservation of a strong state and local role is even more important than it is in the 
mitigation context. 
 
First, climate change adaptation policy will need to address a broader and more 
diffuse set of problems than the ones targeted by mitigation policy.  As J.B. Ruhl has 
noted, mitigation policy is “all about the same goal — cutting down greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere.  Adaptation, by contrast, is about many different 
effects, varies across the nation, operating at many different and sometimes competing 
scales.”55  As a result, while the federal government will have an important role in 
formulating the broad goals of adaptation policy, effective adaptation strategies are likely 
to be site-specific.56  The problems will differ by location (drought may the problem in 
one place, while another is prone to flooding) and, even when the problems are similar, 
what is effective in preparing for and accommodating to the effects of climate change in 
one place (such as preparing for flooding resulting from rising sea levels along the coast) 
may be ineffective or even counterproductive in another (where flooding may be due to 
increased snowmelt in the spring due to rising temperatures).57  In short, effective 
adaptation policy may depend on knowledge of and the ability to respond to diverse local 
conditions.  State and local policymakers may be able to make the necessary adjustments 
more effectively than the federal government can. 
 
Second, climate change adaptation policy will involve areas in which law and 
policy have traditionally been set at the state and local level, and in which the federal 
government has been loath to intervene.  Two obvious such areas are land use control and 
water allocation law.  Land use controls such as zoning are likely to be important parts of 
climate change adaptation strategies.  It may be necessary to restrict development in areas 
vulnerable to flooding or to preserve open space to provide connective corridors for 
migrating wildlife species unable to survive in existing habitat.  Congress has almost 
always steered clear of establishing anything that remotely resembles a federal land use 
regulatory program (other than for lands and resources owned by the federal government) 
                                                 
54
 Id. at 45. 
55
 Ruhl, supra note13, at 423.  See also .”); id. at 420 (“[C]limate change adaptation will be about policing 
the impacts of how hundreds of millions of people, millions of small businesses and farms, and hundreds of 
thousands of local communities respond to climate change in a multitude of decision contexts.”); CBO, 
supra note 1, at 36 (“Unlike mitigation policy, which could be implemented largely with a single 
instrument — for instance, a single emissions price, or an aggregate emissions cap — policies to promote 
adaptation are likely to be more diffuse, involving numerous policies in many different areas and involving 
different levels of government”). 
56
 See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Hothouse Flowers and the Virtues of Climate Federalism, 17 TEMPLE POL. 
& CIV. RIGHTS L. REV. 441, 453 (2008) (“Because the unavoidable consequences of climate change will 
vary from state to state, and region to region, so too will the optimal mix of adaptation measures. Some 
jurisdictions may need to prepare for potential rises in sea level.  Others may need to prepare for the 
possibility of drought.  Still others may need to plan for both.”). 
57
 Cf. Craig, supra note 2, at 29 (arguing that “adaptation law will have to cope with multiple layers of 
governmental interest, since many adaptation strategies will have to be intensely local in implementation, 
while adaptation principles and goals may need to operate on a larger state, watershed, regional, or national 
scale”).  As Professor Ruhl has put it, “the case for localism in adaptation policy . . . is a matter of physical 
reality” as a result of “the variations in climate change impacts across the landscape.”  Ruhl, supra note 13, 
at 423. 
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and has remained committed to protecting the sovereignty of state and local governments 
to control land use.  This commitment, or the fear of the political backlash that the 
adoption of federal land use controls might cause, is a principal explanation, for example, 
of the Clean Water Act’s failure to regulate nonpoint source pollution.58  It also at least 
partially explains why Congress has chosen not to regulate the construction of or access 
to structures that are magnets for automobiles (called indirect sources) under the Clean 
Air Act, even in areas of the country in which automotive pollution has contributed to 
persistent failures to attain the health-based primary national ambient air quality 
standards.59 
 
Climate change also will affect the distribution of water resources, providing too  
much water in some places and not enough in others.60  Adaptation policy can play a 
useful role in preventing waste in areas in which water is plentiful and assuring that water 
is diverted to areas in which shortages exist.  Congress has been just as skittish about 
infringing on state authority to control water allocation as it has to jump into the land use 
regulation business.  As Robert Adler has explained, “since at least the middle of the 
nineteenth century, state water law has reigned supreme as the primary authority 
governing the allocation and use of water resources, as proclaimed by Congress, the 
executive branch, and the courts.”61  Congress went to great lengths in the Clean Water 
Act to steer clear of any such infringement.62  Somewhat less absolutely, the Endangered 
Species Act declares a federal policy “that Federal agencies shall cooperate with State 
and local agencies to resolve water resources issues in concert with conservation of 
                                                 
58
 See, e.g., Robert L. Glicksman & Matthew R. Batzell, Science, Politics, Law, and the Arc of the Clean 
Water Act: The Role of Assumptions in the Adoption of a Pollution Control Landmark, 32 WASH. U. J. L. & 
POL’Y 99, 116 (2010).  See also 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2006) (enunciating a policy of recognizing, 
preserving, and protecting “the primary responsibilities and rights” of states “to plan the development and 
use (including restoration, preservation, and enhancement of land”). 
59
 See ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, DAVID L. MARKELL, WILLIAM W. BUZBEE, DANIEL R. MANDELKER & A. 
DAN TARLOCK, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 506 (5th ed. 2007). 
60
 See, e.g., Robert W. Adler, Climate Change and the Hegemony of State Water Law, 29 STAN. ENVTL. 
L.J. 1, 6 (2010) (noting that “most models suggest that global warming will change the distribution of fresh 
water resources around the country, with some areas considerably drier, others facing greater flood risks, 
and others facing seasonal changes in the amount and distribution of precipitation and runoff”). 
61
 Id. at 4.  But cf. Reed D. Benson, Deflating the Deference Myth: National Interests vs. State Authority 
Under Federal Laws Affecting Water Use, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 241,  312 (2006) (arguing “that federal 
deference to states in water resource matters may be a familiar refrain, but it is not a uniform, or even a 
consistent, requirement of federal law.  Instead, federal statutes and Supreme Court cases have protected 
federal interests while acknowledging that states retain the primary role in choosing how to allocate water 
resources among various users.”). 
62
 The Clean Water Act states: 
 It is the policy of Congress that the authority of each State to allocate quantities of water within 
its jurisdiction shall not be superseded, abrogated or otherwise impaired .  It is the further policy of 
Congress that nothing [in the Act] shall be construed to supersede or abrogate rights to quantities 
of water which have been established by any State. 
33 U.S.C. § 1251(f) (2006).  See also id. § 1251(b) (declaring policy of protecting the primary 
responsibilities and rights of the states to plan the development and use of water resources); id. § 1370 (2) 
(stating that nothing in the Act shall “be construed as impairing or in any manner affecting any jurisdiction 
of the States with respect to the waters (including the boundary waters) of such states”). 
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species.”63  These precedents suggest that Congress will, if possible, tread lightly on state 
and local authority to decide on climate change adaptation measures that entail decisions 
about land use and water allocation. 
 
C. Resolving the Tension Between Historic Tradition and Current Need 
 
 The fact that states and localities have traditionally had played a dominant role in 
controlling land use and water allocation does not mean they will or should continue to 
do so in addressing the risks posed by climate change.  Changes are likely to occur.64  
These traditions do mean, however, that efforts to enhance the federal government’s 
authority to dictate land use and water application policy, or even to adopt minimal 
federal standards under a cooperative federalism-like regime, are likely to generate at 
least as much political opposition as the efforts to adopt mandatory controls on GHG 
emissions or to price carbon have done.  A tension between leaving sacrosanct state and 
local prerogatives in areas such as land and water use and recognizing the need for a 
larger federal role is therefore apt to shape the institutional design of federal climate 
change adaptation policy, whenever the federal government is prepared to tackle climate 
change adaptation.  In striking the appropriate balance, collective action analysis may 
provide environmental policymakers with important insights on when it is appropriate for 
the federal government to establish a presence even in areas in which it has thus far been 
reluctant to stake out a significant role and on related institutional design questions. 
 
III. COLLECTIVE ACTION AND CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION POLICY 
 
 Collective action theory examines the dynamics of individual behavior in group 
settings.  Collective action theorists such as Mancur Olson recognized that the benefits of 
collective action are often a species of public good that members of the collective will 
enjoy even if they do not contribute to the creation of these goods.  This dynamic creates 
an incentive for individual members of the collective to “free ride” on the efforts of 
others.65  Under this theory, individual states have incentives to take actions that will 
deviate from the interests of the nation as a collective.  These incentives become 
problematic if transaction and enforcement costs prevent an effective agreement among 
the states to act collectively so that all states contribute in equitable fashion to the public 
good and none act in a manner that is contrary to the interests of states as a collective.66 
                                                 
63
 16 U.S.C. § 1531(c)(2( (2006).  Cf. Benson, supra note 61, at 316 (“In enacting the CWA and the ESA, 
Congress preserved this traditional state role, but established a strong policy of controlling water pollution 
and conserving biodiversity in all fifty states.”). 
64
 See Daniel A. Farber, Climate Change, Federalism, and the Constitution, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 879, 914 
(2008) (“Traditionally, state and local governments have been the major regulators of land use and urban 
development.  Responding to climate change may result in changes to this tradition.  Given the national and 
international scope of climate change, the need for an integrated national strategy for controlling emissions 
and planning adaptation  is strong.”); Adler, supra note 60, at 60 (arguing that longstanding federal 
deference to state water law and policy “may change — indeed, it may have to change — in the face of 
climate change”). 
65
 Glicksman & Levy, supra note 15, at 579 n.1 (citing MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE 
ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965). 
66
 See Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Access to Courts and Preemption of State Remedies in 
Collective Action Perspective, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. ___, ___ (2010) (forthcoming). 
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Federalism is thus a structural response to collective action problems among states that 
arise when a state, for example, taxes collective entities excessively because it retains the 
benefit of the tax while spreading the economic burden to other states.67  As I and my 
coauthor Richard Levy have explained elsewhere: 
 
The exercise of federal authority is most justified in response to collective 
action problems that provide incentives for states to act in a manner that is 
inconsistent with the interest of the nation as a whole.  Most federal regulatory 
legislation responds to one or more collective action problems, as reflected in the 
statutory purposes.  In other words, federal action is necessary or justified when 
state regulation is unlikely to produce the optimal result, viewed from the 
perspective of the United States as a whole, because the incentives of individual 
states and the interests of the states as a collective run in different directions.68 
 
 In this part of the article, I summarize the five types of collective action problems 
that have most frequently justified federal regulation of activities that create risks of harm 
to public health and natural resources.69  In the second section of this part, I consider 
whether these collective action problems justify the establishment of a federal floor to 
counter state inaction or inadequate state action on climate change adaptation that derives 
from individual state incentives to benefit at the expensive of the national interest.  In the 
third section, I explore whether any of the problems identified in the first section justify a 
more intrusive (and exclusive) federal role in climate change adaptation in which federal 
policy displaces the capacity of states and localities to supplement or deviate from the 
federal program. 
 
A. Collective Action Justifications for A Federal Role 
 
Many of the traditional justifications for federal environmental regulation are 
based on collective analysis in that they posit a federal presence as an appropriate barrier 
to state actions that deviate from the collective national interest.70  This section 
summarizes each of these arguments in favor of creating a federal presence in 
environmental regulation.  Each is designed to allow federal action to thwart individual 
state environmental laws and policies that threaten to interfere with collective concerns. 
 
1. Transboundary Negative Externalities 
 
                                                 
67
 Glicksman & Levy, supra note 15, at 593. 
68
 Levy & Glicksman, supra note 66, at ___. 
69
 The justifications for adopting laws that govern use and management of lands and resources owned by 
the federal government are at times different and will not be addressed here.  See generally 1 GEORGE 
CAMERON COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES LAW §§ 1:3-1:6, 1:16, 1:22-
1:23 (2d ed. 2007). 
70
 This summary is largely taken from the discussion of the justifications for federal environmental 
regulation described in Glicksman & Levy, supra note 15, at 594-602.  That discussion includes examples 
of explicit reliance by legislators on these justifications during the process of adopting many of the nation’s 
landmark federal environmental laws. 
__ ENVTL. L. ___ (2011) (forthcoming) 
   
 
15
One of the earliest and least contentious justifications for federal environmental 
regulation is the desire to prevent transboundary (interstate and international) 
externalities.71  State and local governments can allow industrial and developmental 
activities operating within their jurisdiction to externalize environmental harms, 
particularly air and water pollution.  Upstream states, for example, have incentives to 
refrain from regulating pollution-causing activities that generate interstate environmental 
spillover costs.72  The result of a source state’s failure to regulate such activities is to 
secure for state residents the economic and tax benefits of the activity creating the 
spillovers while exporting the environmental burdens to other states.  The states affected 
by the activity that generates adverse spillover effects have strong incentives to regulate 
the offending activity but lack the legal authority to do so.73  Thus, even if the economic 
benefits garnered by the source state are outweighed by the environmental costs suffered 
in downwind or downstream states, state regulation will not block the activity.  Only the 
federal government has both the incentives and authority to regulate consistent with the 
interests of the states as a collective by restricting spillover effects to the point at which 
they are lower than the economic and social gains produced by the polluting activity.74  
 
2. Resource Pooling 
 
                                                 
71
 Externalities are spillover costs imposed on persons other than those who produce them that are not taken 
into account by those who produce them.  Regulation can force those who impose such costs to internalize 
them.  See, e.g., SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, REGULATORY LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 53–54 (3d ed. 2003). 
72
 According to one prominent analyst of interstate spillovers, “[t]he problem of interstate externalities 
arises because a state that sends pollution to another state obtains the labor and fiscal benefits of the 
economic activity that generates the pollution but does not suffer the full costs of the activity.  Under these 
conditions, economic theory maintains that an undesirably large amount of pollution will cross state lines.”  
Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2341, 2343 
(1996).  See also William W. Buzbee, The Regulatory Fragmentation Continuum: Westway and the 
Challenges of Regional Growth, 21 J.L. & POL. 323, 344 (2005) (“Even where a social ill is widely 
recognized, the existence of multiple potential regulators will create predictable incentives for regulatory 
inattention. Especially where the causes of an ill cross jurisdictional borders, the harms themselves cross 
borders, and there is vertical or horizontal fragmentation of potential regulatory turfs, incentives for 
regulatory inattention are strong.”). 
73
 See, e.g., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982) (discussing contours of the constitutional 
prohibition on extraterritorial legislation); National Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n v. Meyer, 165 F.3d 1151 
(7th Cir. 1999) (striking down as an improper “clog on interstate commerce,” and as improper 
extraterritorial legislation, a Wisconsin statute allowing out-of-state waste to be disposed of in Wisconsin 
only if the community where the waste originates adopts an ordinance incorporating the mandatory 
components of Wisconsin's recycling program). 
74
 See David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, The Case Against Reallocating Environmental Regulatory 
Authority, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1796, 1804 (2008) (citing Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? 
Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE 
L.J. 1196, 1210 (1977)) (“In line with the matching principle, Stewart claimed that environmental 
regulation should be elevated to the federal level when local decision makers would not internalize all of 
the costs and benefits of regulatory action or inaction (for example, interstate water or air pollution 
spillovers).”).  Distributional considerations may justify regulating to a point different from the 
economically efficient level of regulation at which the economic benefits to the collective equal the 
environmental costs to the collective.  Collective action analysis, however, focuses on the cost calculus. 
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A second justification for federal environmental regulation is the achievement of 
economies of scale or synergistic effects through resource pooling.  The advantages of 
resource pooling qualify as a “public good,” which in collective action terms creates an 
incentive for each state to free ride on the efforts of others.   The federal government 
often has superior resources because it can pool the resources of the states.   In the 
environmental context, resource pooling has the capacity to generate efficiencies in the 
collection and distribution of scientific and technical information.75  The federal 
government’s superior resource base thus may support vesting federal agencies with 
responsibilities to gather and disseminate information needed to make regulatory 
decisions, although resource pooling justifies creation of a federal role in generating 
information and disseminating it to the states, more than it does allocating to the federal 
government the authority to regulate risk-creating activities. The resource pooling 
rationale also may be relevant to regulatory enforcement, however.  Much as cartelization 
and collective bargaining tend to enhance the clout of the companies or unions whose 
efforts are pooled, the superior resources often available to federal regulators may make 
put them in a better position to induce desirable behavior by regulated entities than state 
or local authorities can.76 
 
3. The Race to the Bottom 
 
A third rationale for federal environmental regulation is the so-called “race to the 
bottom.”   This justification proceeds on the premise that competition for business and 
industry will drive states to relax their environmental standards to gain the economic 
benefits and tax revenues brought to them if businesses or industries decide to locate 
within their borders.  This dynamic proceeds even if the states as a collective would be 
better off if the states did not seek to undercut each other due to each state’s fear that if it 
decides to regulate, it will lose out to states who prioritize the economic benefits of 
economic activity more than its environmental costs.  Scholars have debated whether the 
empirical evidence supports the race to the bottom theory, but Congress has relied on the 
theory as a rationale for federal action whatever the reality is.77  In one case, for example, 
the Supreme Court described the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act  as a 
response “to a congressional finding that nationwide ‘surface mining and reclamation 
standards are essential in order to insure that competition in interstate commerce among 
sellers of coal produced in different States will not be used to undermine the ability of the 
several States to improve and maintain adequate standards on coal mining operations 
                                                 
75
 Glicksman & Levy, supra note 15, at 596.  The benefits of resource pooling in this context have been 
summarized as follows: 
Where effective regulation will require substantial investigation of technological 
capabilities, or links between pollutants and health impacts, or comprehensive assessment 
of diverse jurisdictions’ pollution control efforts, economies of scale will favor a federal 
role.  Otherwise, no individual state will have incentives to gather these sorts of valuable 
information, and all states will be tempted to free ride on any state that makes such an 
investment.  Federal leadership also reduces the risk of duplicative regulatory 
investigation.  For this reason, federal gathering and creation of information about 
pollution impacts and pollution control has long been part of federal environmental laws.   
GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 59, at 86. 
76
 See Glicksman & Levy, supra note 15, at 596-97. 
77
 For a sampling of the literature on both sides of the argument, see id. at 597-98. 
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within their borders.’”78  Thus, federal regulation can halt the race to the bottom by 
subjecting activities that generate environmental harms to a minimal level of regulation 
that no state can undercut. 
 
4. Uniform Standards 
 
The need for uniform standards provides yet another important justification for 
federal environmental regulation.  Uniform standards reduce transaction costs for 
regulated entities such as product manufacturers and distributors, especially for 
commodities sold in interstate commerce.79  In theory, states acting independently may be 
able to develop uniform standards by harmonizing their laws, but in practice it is difficult 
and unusual for them to fully achieve uniformity in the regulation of products that 
produce environmental spillover costs.  In authorizing federal regulation of the adverse 
environmental consequences of the manufacture and use of products such as automobiles, 
Congress has viewed uniform federal regulation as a way to relieve product 
manufacturers of the need to keep abreast of and comply with a welter of potentially 
contradictory regulatory restrictions resulting from regulation by individual states.80 
 
5. The NIMBY Syndrome 
 
The not-in-my-backyard, or NIMBY, phenomenon arises when there is 
widespread consensus about the social need for an activity with which undesirable 
consequences are associated, but no one wants the activity to be located near them.  All 
hope instead that the activity will be located elsewhere so that they can take advantage of 
the economic or social benefits that the activity produces without having to bear any of 
the negative consequences.  In the environmental context, individual states may adopt 
regulations that make it unattractive or impossible for an activity such as a nuclear waste 
disposal site to receive necessary permits or similar authorizations to proceed within their 
borders in an attempt to drive the activity into other states.  The NIMBY phenomenon 
represents the flip side of the transboundary negative externality problem.  The source of 
a NIMBY problem is a positive externality in that the state in which the activity locates 
bears all or most of the environmental burdens, but the economic benefits are spread to 
other states.81  Federal regulation has the capacity to combat NIMBYism by precluding 
                                                 
78
 Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 281-82 (1981) (quoting 30 
U.S.C. § 1201(g)). 
79
 See Adelman & Engel, supra note 38, at 1839 (explaining that the uniformity rationale for federal 
regulation is based on the principle that “manufacturers of goods distributed in a national market should not 
be required to comply with fifty different state standards applicable to the design or operation of their 
products”).  “Even where standards can be met by meeting the most stringent standard, this might put a 
company in a position whereby it would face the prospect of modifying its product to meet the most 
stringent standards or deciding not to market its product at all in the state with the most stringent 
standards.”  Robert B. McKinstry, Jr. & Thomas D. Peterson, The Business of Climate Change: Challenges 
and Opportunities for Multinational Business Enterprises: The Implications of the New “Old” Federalism 
in Climate-Change Legislation: How to Function in a Global Marketplace When States Take the Lead, 20 
PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 61, 89-90 (2007). 
80
 See Glicksman & Levy, supra note 15, at 599-600. 
81
 See id. at 600-02. 
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all states from adopting laws that create unwarranted obstacles to the undesirable activity, 
thereby putting all states on equal footing and at equal risk. 
 
6. The Threat of Under and Overregulation by the States 
 
The five justifications discussed above provide a rationale for using federal 
regulation to forestall state environmental regulation that harms the national interest in 
circumstances in which the incentives of individual states prompt them to take actions 
that would harm the interests of the states as a collective.  Sometimes, a state will have 
incentives not to regulate (e.g., when in-state industries create negative spillover costs 
outside the state, when a state seeks to free ride on the information gathering efforts of 
other states, or when a state refrains from regulating in an effort not to lose industry as a 
result of a race to the bottom).82  In such cases, federal regulation can establish a 
regulatory floor that counters the state’s inclination not to regulate or to regulate weakly.  
At other times, collective action analysis predicts more state regulation than is consistent 
with the national good (e.g., when a state seeks to keep environmentally undesirable 
activities from locating inside the state or when a state regulates products that generate 
environmental harms inside the state but that are manufactured elsewhere, in effect 
externalizing the negative economic impact of regulation).  The federal government can 
respond to such efforts by displacing the offending state law. 
 
Collective action analysis thus has the potential to assist policymakers in 
identifying when state efforts to adapt to climate change are likely to be too weak or too 
strong.  This information can support appropriate federal responses that realign individual 
state actions so that they correspond to the interests of states as a collective.  The next 
section address when federal action may be necessary to establish a federal floor so that 
all states take on their fair share of preparing for and responding to the challenges of 
climate change.  The third section in this part addresses the opposite problem, when 
federal action may be needed to preclude overreaction by the states that may mitigate the 
adverse effects of climate change in one jurisdiction but result in even greater such 
effects elsewhere. 
 
B. Collective Action and Minimal State and Local Participation 
 
Collective considerations suggest that the federal government should establish a 
“floor” to prevent state failure to take steps to adapt to climate change or inadequate state 
responses from harming those located outside the state.  Federal policy to supply a floor 
that addresses these kinds of problems of inadequate state adaptation measures could be 
structured in the ways suggested by two of the three models discussed in Part II A above 
(e.g., through information sharing, the use of conditional federal funding, or some kind of 
cooperative federalism approach).  Displacement of state and local law generally would 
                                                 
82
 The same dynamic operates at the international level.  Cf. Scott Barrett & Michael Toman, Contrasting 
Future Paths for an Evolving Global Climate Regime,  The World Bank, Policy Research Working paper 
5164, at 3 (Jan. 2010) (“Even when benefits for each country from global abatement are high, the incentive 
for each country to contribute significantly to global abatement may be weak since each country gets back 
just a fraction of the total benefit of its own abatement.”). 
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be inappropriate if the problem is inadequate state activity rather than overly zealous state 
responses to climate change. 
 
1. Federal Provision of Information, Financial Aid, and Planning 
Assistance 
 
The resource pooling justification for a federal presence in environmental matters 
suggests an appropriate federal role in gathering and distributing information needed to 
make informed climate change adaptation policy choices. Even though adaptive 
responses will often be driven by location-specific considerations, the federal 
government, given its superior resource base compared to those of the states and 
localities, can provide perform a critical function by developing a shared information 
infrastructure.83  The gathering and distribution of information on the likely effects of 
climate change and the alternative ways of responding to them would preclude the need 
for every state to reinvent the adaptation wheel.84  Resource pooling does not strongly 
support forcing states to engage in a minimum level of information gathering, even 
though states will have incentives to free ride on the efforts of other jurisdictions,85 
because the lack of state capacity to perform this function is the very reason for federal 
intervention.  Climate change legislation proposed during the 111th Congress invariably 
included provisions that would have created new federal information gathering entities 
and programs.86  Similarly, the federal government should play a role in financing 
adaptive responses by lower levels of government.87  By taking on at least part of the 
financial burden of activities such as disaster relief planning and response, the federal 
                                                 
83
   See Camacho, supra note  2, at 66 (“By providing regulators access to information on the achievements 
and limitations of past management strategies, Congress would help reduce uncertainty by allowing 
regulators considering adaptations to draw from other management experiences.”).  Cf. Stine Aakre & Dirk 
T.G. Rübbelke, Adaptation to Climate Change in the European Union: Efficiency vs. Equity 
Considerations, CEPS Working Document No. 301/September 2008, at 17, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1275262&download=yes (arguing that “in order to get 
an efficient allocation in the case of national/domestic public adaptation goods, national government 
intervention in adaptation efforts may be justified, especially when taking into account that national 
governments may have information advantages on local/regional adaptation compared with  decision-
makers at the EU-level.”). 
84
 Federal entities in other countries have recognized this point.  See, e.g., GERMAN ADAPTATION, supra 
note  22, at 54 (“There is no point in constantly reinventing the wheel.  The [German] Federal Government 
is therefore making available a toolbox that enables actors to find out what climate change has in store for 
them in their field and what means they have of dealing with it.”).  But cf. id. at 29 (describing role of 
Germany’s federal government in providing general information about flooding risks and precautions, but 
stating that “it is the cities and municipalities which identify where specific risks exist”). 
85
 See Camacho, supra note 2, at 28 (arguing that “[r]egulators who act early are likely to receive diluted 
credit as other regulators free ride on their efforts while status quo biases and risk aversion create additional 
incentives for regulatory inaction.  Regulators thus have little incentive to devote resources to gather 
information on — or regulate the risks of—global climate change.”). 
86
 See, e.g., American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. §§ 451(b), 452 
(2009); Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, S. 1733, 111th Cong. §§ 367, 371 (2009). 
87
 See, e.g., Farber, Mapping, supra note 23, at 17 (“The federal government might simply take adaptation 
as its own responsibility and pay for projects directly from the Treasury.  Alternatively, state and local 
governments might receive federal grants to engage in adaptation, or private sector actors might receive tax 
credits or other subsidies.”). 
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government can assist in risk spreading.88  Proposed federal climate change legislation 
has consistently created new grant and other financial assistance programs.89 
 
The federal government also is best situated to assist states and localities in 
coordinating their policy responses so that they do not work at cross purposes and in 
mediating disputes among jurisdictions.90  The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change has emphasized the need for cross-jurisdictional coordination both within and 
among nations.91  The federal government’s failure to play that role effectively has 
plagued governmental efforts to respond to previous disasters, such as Hurricane 
Katrina.92 
 
 2. Federally Required Adaptive Measures 
 
Because the uniformity and NIMBY rationales for a federal environmental 
regulatory presence premise federal intervention on the need to prevent excessive state or 
local regulation from impairing the collective national interest, these two kinds of 
collective action problems are unlikely to justify a federal regulatory floor for adaptation.  
Floors are designed to combat free riding and state inaction, not excessive state 
regulation.  Transboundary negative externalities and the race to the bottom, on the other 
hand, can be expected to produce inadequate state and local regulation, and therefore 
                                                 
88
 Professor Farber has made this point.  See id. at 15 (“The underlying principle could be called ‘taxpayer 
pays,’ and rests on the premise that society as a whole should protect individuals from certain kinds of 
harm.  This system achieves that maximum amount of loss spreading.  It expresses the idea that climate 
change is a national problem, thus emphasizing national solidarity in the face of the threat.”).  Farber also 
argues, however, that federal financing may be inappropriate in some contexts.  Federal subsidization of 
flood insurance, for example, may provide incentives for states and localities to overinvest in projects that 
create climate-related risks, such as building in flood zones, because the federal government will be paying 
to cover those risks.  Id. at 14-15.  He suggests that federal funding be limited to situations involving 
spillovers, obstacles to state provision of adaptation measures, or a strong claim for “national solidarity.”  
Id. at 18. 
89
 See, e.g., Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, S. 1733, 111th Cong. § 381 (2009) (proposing 
program to provide funds to states for water system adaptation projects); id. § 382 (proposing to require 
EPA to establish a program to provide funds to states for flood control projects). 
90
 See Craig, supra note 2, at 53-54 (arguing that “to reduce redundancies, increase efficiency, and avoid 
conflicting adaptation measures, planning must be coordinated, and where possible integrated, within and 
among those various levels”).  See also Camacho, supra note 2, at 65 (“The funding and development by 
Congress of a large-scale procedural adaptation that fosters information sharing is crucial for reducing the 
negative effects of regulatory fragmentation and managing the uncertainty from climate change.”).     
91
 See Craig, supra note 2, at 60 (quoting INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
ADAPTATION REPORT: SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 20 (2007) (“According to the IPCC, responses to 
climate change should include ‘actions at all levels from the individual citizen through to national 
governments and international organizations.’  Such multilevel efforts, however, will be most effective if 
they are coordinated or, at the very least, not working at cross-purposes.”). 
92
 See Leonard, supra note 34, at 555 (arguing that the lack of integrated communication among land use 
planners that characterizes the U.S. system “was exemplified by the confusion and inadequate response that 
characterized response efforts to the devastating effects of Hurricane Katrina,” and that a “top down, well 
organized planning regime” is needed to address such problems).  See generally Center for Progressive 
Reform, An Unnatural Disaster: The Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina (September 2005), 
http://progressivereform.org/articles/Unnatural_Disaster_512.pdf (describing the governmental failures that 
hindered an effective response to the hurricane). 
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should justify the adoption of federal floors for adaptive measures that apply in all 
jurisdictions.  Federal policymakers can adjust the degree to which these floors infringe 
on state and local prerogatives by choosing one or another of the models for federal 
action discussed above (e.g., through conditional funding or other forms of traditional 
cooperative federalism in environmental law). 
 
Enactment of a federal floor is an appropriate way to prevent states from failing to 
take adaptive measures that could have avoided transboundary effects, particularly if the 
state could have mitigated those effects more efficiently than other jurisdictions.  Many 
aspects of climate will generate harms that cross jurisdictional borders.  Four examples 
will suffice to make the point.  The first two examples concern water supplies, both too 
little and too much.  Suppose, for example, that a group of states in the Southwest that 
share a common water source (such as the Colorado River) is plagued by drought as 
warming temperatures and associated climatic shifts reduce the amount or temporal 
distribution of precipitation received by the area.93  If one of the affected states refuses to 
enact water conservation measures, downriver states may experience sharply reduced 
supplies.94  At the opposite end of the water availability spectrum, a state that refuses to 
take flood control measures may put neighboring states at risk.  Wetlands, for example, 
can serve as buffers against storms and the flooding they produce.95  If a coastal state 
fails to prevent destruction of wetlands through development, a storm that could have 
been mitigated by preservation of coastal wetlands could hit a neighboring state harder 
than it otherwise would have, creating an increased risk of flooding. 
 
Three more examples concern pest proliferation, infrastructure damage, and air 
pollution.  Climate change is allowing pests to survive in areas that were inhospitable to 
them when temperatures were cooler.96  A state that fails to treat proliferating pests may 
                                                 
93
 “Because conflicts over water are already acute in the western United States, the potential impacts of 
climate change on water resources in that region are of significant concern. . . .  In general, scientists expect 
that [the effects of climate change] are likely to decrease stream flows and reservoir storage.”  Adler, supra 
note 60, at 13.  For a discussion of drought and climate change, see Robin Kundis Craig, Adapting Water 
Law to Public Necessity: Reframing Climate Change Adaptation as Emergency Response and 
Preparedness, 34 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 781, 789=91 (2010); Farber, Mapping, supra note 16, at 4-5. 
94
 See Adler, supra note 60, at 40 (“Especially in times of increased scarcity, leaving decisions about 
interstate transfers entirely to state law could result in decisions that benefit individual states at the expense 
of the national interest.  Some states might engage in hoarding and protectionism by seeking to prevent 
interstate transfers even if the result was environmental or economic calamity in other regions.  Other states 
might seek short-term profit from their saleable water resources at the expense of nationally-significant 
aquatic environments.”). See also Farber, Mapping, supra note 16, at 10 (claiming that failure to conserve 
water in one state may decrease supplies or impair water use downstream). 
95
 See Elizabeth Burleson, Climate Change Consensus: Emerging International Law, 34 WM. & MARY 
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 543, 578 (2010) (“Wetlands, coral reefs and mangrove forests provide natural 
storm buffers.”). 
96
 See Matthew Zinn, Adapting to Climate Change: Environmental Law in a Warmer World, 34 ECOLOGY 
L.Q. 61, 74 (2007) (“Vector-borne diseases such as malaria that currently do not occur or are uncommon in 
the United States are expected to expand into previously inhospitable areas.  In some cases, the disease 
vector, such as the anopheles mosquito, is already present in the United States, but the parasite does not 
develop under current climatic conditions.  Increasing temperatures may expand the range of vectors and 
allow parasites to thrive in new locations.”).   
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increase the risk of destruction of natural resources97 or of the spread of disease vectors in 
nearby states to which the pests spread as a result.98  Climate change is likely to damage 
critical infrastructure such as bridges, highways, sewer systems, and utility transmission 
lines.99  One state’s failure to strengthen infrastructure to protect against the risk of 
climate change-related damage or repair infrastructure such as highways or electricity 
transmission lines may adversely affect other states who depend on continuing access to 
the affected transportation networks or electric power.100  In all of these cases, federal 
action may be needed to mitigate the risks of widespread harm flowing from one state’s 
inactivity.  Finally, scientists have determined that increasing temperatures linked to 
GHG emissions will exacerbate ozone pollution.101  One state’s failure to abate emissions 
of pollutants that are ozone precursors could create health risks in downwind states as a 
result of the long-range transport of ozone pollution.102 
 
The race to the bottom theory also may justify the creation of minimal federal 
requirements concerning adaptation.  Several examples help make the point.  Local 
governments may seek to attract new real estate development by allowing building in 
flood plains or other at risk areas, especially if the federal government is providing 
insurance for these activities, or by adopting weak building standards that are not 
adequate to protect against damage from severe storms or flooding linked to climate 
                                                 
97
 Warming temperatures have paved the way for an infestation of western forests by mountain pine 
beetles.  See, e.g., Craig, supra note 2, at 13 (noting that the mountain pine beetle “invades pines, 
particularly lodgepole pines, and kills them.  The beetle's territory is normally limited by cold winters, but 
since the 1970s, warming temperatures have expanded the beetle’s potential range by more than seventy-
five percent.  Mountain pine beetles  have been taking advantage of this new habitat in British Columbia, 
Canada, and the northern Rockies in the United States (especially Colorado and Wyoming), and the 
expansion of the species can only be explained by changes in climate.”); id. at 54 (characterizing the pine 
beetle infestation as creating “an impact of national importance”). 
98
 See, e.g., Linda Munson et al., Climate Extremes Promote Fatal Co-Infections During Canine Distemper 
Epidemics in African Lions, PLOS ONE (June 25, 2008) (arguing that "[t]emporal and spatial convergence 
of several infectious agents under environmental conditions that favor their transmission and propagation 
could create a 'perfect storm' of pathogens, resulting in significantly greater mortality,” in that case of 
lions). 
99
 See Elizabeth C. Black, Climate Change Adaptation: Local Solutions for a Global Problem, 22 GEO. 
INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 359, 365 (2010) (noting that among the less widely recognized effects of climate 
change are “the predicted increased frequency of severe weather events, from hurricanes to heat waves, 
[which threaten] to damage electricity infrastructure, such as power plants and transmission lines”). 
100
 See Farber, Mapping, supra note 16, at 10 (stating that “infrastructure that is exposed to climate impacts 
such as highways, railroads, power lines, and pipelines, may suffer service interruptions that impact 
businesses and individuals well outside a state’s borders”). 
101
 See Mark Z. Jacobson, On the Causal Link Between Carbon Dioxide and Air Pollution Mortality, 35 
GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS L03809 (2008) (finding that increased water vapor and temperatures from 
higher CO2 concentrations may exacerbate ozone pollution and increase U.S. annual air pollution deaths 
and cancers). 
102
 See EPA, Final Rule To Implement the 8-Hour Ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standard — Phase 
1, 69 Fed. Reg. 23,951 23,958 (Apr. 30, 2004) (discussing “the long-range transport of ozone and the 
importance of employing regional controls in addition to local controls”).  The provisions of the Clean Air 
Act that requires states to achieve the national ambient air quality standards for ozone already address this 
problem, though not effectively enough to abate all interstate ozone pollution.  See North Carolina v. EPA, 
531 F.3d 896 (D.C. Cir. 2008), modified on reh’g, 550 F.3d 1176 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (striking down EPA’s 
Clean Air Act Interstate Rule). 
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change.103  Some states and localities may refuse to restrict potentially lucrative land 
development in areas needed for the creation of wildlife migration corridors.104  States 
may refuse to impose restrictions on water use by agriculture and other high-consumption 
industries for fear of driving these industries away.  Similarly, they may be reluctant to 
require measures (such as best management practices) needed to reduce the risk of runoff 
that may impair water quality, even if anticipated increases in precipitation threaten 
erosion or other forms of nonpoint source pollution.105  In these and other instances, a 
federal regulatory floor can prevent state or local inaction from failing to abate adverse 
consequences of climate change that damage the national interest. 
 
C. Collective Action and Preemption of State and Local Action 
 
The flip side of the collective action coin involves deciding whether the federal 
government should limit the power of state or local governments to engage in adaptive 
responses to climate change through partial or complete preemption.  Preemption 
doctrine allocates decisional responsibility when federal and state governments exercise 
concurrent authority.  The key question is whether collective action problems create 
incentives for individual states to acts in ways that conflict with the interests of the states 
as a collective.  The distorting effects of collective action problems can lead states to 
undervalue either the environmental costs that regulation is designed to prevent or the 
economic burdens that regulation can create.  Generally, collective action analysis favors 
preemption when the underlying rationale for federal intervention is a concern about 
overregulation by the states.  For current purposes, overregulation would take the form of 
“excessive” or counterproductive adaptation responses. 
 
 1. Non-Problematic State and Local Adaptation Measures 
 
Some state and local efforts to reduce the adverse consequences of climate change 
should not be problematic from a collective action perspective.  Any benefits for the 
adopting jurisdiction derived from state or local efforts to promote (or require) water 
conservation in response to water shortages linked to climate change, for example, would 
not appear to conflict with collective interests.106  Likewise, local land use controls aimed 
at moving development away from flood-prone areas or areas located adjacent to forests 
at high fire risk of wildfire activity, the adoption of stronger building codes to allow 
structures to withstand floods or to require greater energy efficiency to reduce demands 
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 Weak land use controls may attract real estate development.  See Farber, Mapping, supra note 16, at 12. 
104
 See Craig, supra note 2, at 56 (arguing that local land use planning “operates at the wrong scale to deal 
with mass migrations”). 
105
 The disincentive to regulate may be particularly strong if the activities threatening to degrade water 
quality are located near a jurisdictional border, so that downstream jurisdictions will suffer most of the 
adverse effects. 
106
 See Adler, supra note 60, at 34 (noting that some regions have already adopted strategies to limit growth 
in light of water resource limitations).  Restrictions on water use are not necessarily completely benign, 
however.  See, e.g., David Zahniser & Jessica Garrison, Lawn-Watering Rules Contributed to L.A. Main 
Breaks, Experts Find, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2010 (describing study finding that high-volume water main 
breaks in Los Angeles were caused in part by the city’s restrictions on lawn watering, which caused 
fluctuations in water pressure that led to bursting of pipes). 
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for electricity and protect against heat-related illnesses, and the adoption of storm water 
design standards to allow urban areas to accommodate higher water flows would not 
appear to create collective action problems such as transboundary externalities, a welter 
of conflicting standards applicable to product manufacturers, or NIMBYism.  Indeed, 
some adaptation measures are likely to create environmental benefits that extend beyond 
the adopting jurisdiction.  One example might be the adoption of land use controls that 
preserve open spaces in flood prone areas by reducing the amount of impervious surface 
area and thus decreasing the volume and contamination of surface runoff that flows into 
interstate surface water bodies.107 
 
Further, several of the collective action justifications for creating a federal 
presence in climate change adaptation policy generally would not support making that 
presence exclusive.  Because preemption targets excessive state or local regulation 
motivated by concerns that diverge from the collective interest, neither the race to the 
bottom nor resource pooling problems tend to support preemption of state and local 
authority to take steps to adapt to climate change.  The race to the bottom tends to make 
states unwilling to take regulatory action that may drive up the costs of doing business 
compared to the costs in states that take no action or weaker action.  The problem created 
by the race to the bottom is inaction.  That problem does not exist if a state or locality 
decides to take adaptive measures despite the presence of adverse economic impacts 
within the jurisdiction.  As  a result, collective action principles provide no justification 
for displacing state or local authority to pursue those measures. 
 
Resource pooling also would not generally support preemption because resource 
pooling by the federal government is a response to the tendency of states to free ride on 
the efforts of other jurisdictions.  If a state or locality gathers information to allow it to 
take adaptive measures, it acts counter to the collective action incentive to free ride.   
Preemption would appear to be appropriate only if state or local action would weaken the 
national government’s ability to threaten other nations that the United States will not 
contribute to adaptation efforts without their participation, an argument that relates to the 
ability of resource pooling to enhance bargaining leverage.108  The courts have rejected 
the argument that Congress intended to preempt state limits on GHG emissions from 
automobiles to afford the federal government a stronger bargaining chip in dealing with 
foreign nations.109  As a policy matter, the argument in favor of preemption is even 
weaker in connection with adaptation than it is for mitigation.  Reductions in GHG 
emissions in one jurisdiction will benefit other jurisdictions to the same extent that they 
benefit the enacting jurisdiction because global concentrations of GHGs are uniform.  
Because reductions in GHG emissions in the United States will benefit other nations 
vulnerable to climate change, those other nations may have respond to threats by the 
United States not to enact GHG emission controls absent reciprocal action so that other 
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 See CARTER & CULP, supra note 21, at 24. 
108
 See supra note __ and accompanying text. 
109
 See Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Goldstene, 529 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1182-88 (E.D. Cal. 2007), 
reconsideration denied, 563 F. Supp.2d 1158 (E.D. Cal. 2008); Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge 
Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295, 392-97 (D. Vt. 2007).  For discussion of these cases, see Glicksman 
& Levy, supra note 15, at 617-24. 
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nations will benefit from the reduced risks of climate change stemming from U.S. 
reductions.  Adaptation responses, at least in certain contexts, will have more localized 
effects.  A threat by State A not to take steps to protect against flooding will likely not 
register with non-adjacent State B, which either is not threatened by flooding or faces 
threats whose magnitude will not be affected by State A’s action or inaction. 
 
2. Preemption and Potentially Problematic State and Local 
Adaptation Measures 
 
The uniformity and NIMBY rationales for the creation of a federal environmental 
policymaking structure would appear to be more relevant to the need to preempt state and 
local adaptation measures because these collective action problems involve excessive 
regulation by individual members of the collective.  The uniformity rationale for federal 
preemption applies when the application of multiple standards creates excessive 
transaction costs for regulated entities.110  That rationale has typically been used to justify 
preemption of state and local regulation of nationally marketed products that create 
adverse environmental effects, such as cars111 and pesticides.112  It is not immediately 
apparent that climate change adaptation measures will involve mass marketing of 
products subject to potentially conflicting standards or otherwise create the same kinds of 
threats of excessive transaction costs that occur in the mitigation context.113  Building 
codes, for example, need not be uniform because construction design tends to be site-
specific.114  There may be a need for a uniforms set of rules governing inter-jurisdictional 
water transfers, however, to prevent individual states from adopting laws that prohibit or 
restrict water transfers as a means of hoarding scarce water supplies.115 In addition, the 
desire for uniformity may support displacement if state activities threaten to disrupt the 
                                                 
110
 The argument often used to support preemption of state and local regulation of product content is that 
multiple standards create a confusing and unwieldy “patchwork” of regulations.  See Richard J. Lazarus, 
Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1153, 1229 n. 320 (2009) (quoting Eric Lipton & Gardiner Harris, In Turnaround, Industries Seek 
U.S. Regulations: A Broad Tactical Shift; Trying to Fend Off Suits, Foreign Competitors and State Efforts, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2007, at A1 (“While businesses often oppose requirements by saying they are 
unnecessary as it is already in their interest to produce safe products, at other times they have asked for 
them to avoid a patchwork of state regulations, to ensure that competitors must meet the same standard or 
to provide legal protection.”)). 
111
 See 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2006). 
112
 See 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (2006). 
113
 Professor Adler has pointed out the obstacles to the adoption of national water efficiency standards for 
industries such as agriculture.  Adler, supra note 60, at 36.  He has raised the possibility of the use of a 
cooperative federalism structure to promote efficient water use, in which Congress sets an efficiency goal 
and delegates to the states the authority to develop efficiency standards suitable for their own climates, 
uses, and conditions.  Id. at 37-38. 
114
 See Glicksman & Levy, supra note 15, at 635 & n.265 (citing Thomas Magnusson, Fredrik Tell & Jim 
Watson, From CoPS to Mass Production?  Capabilities and Innovation in Power Generation Equipment 
Manufacturing, 14 INDUSTRIAL & CORP. CHANGE 1, 1 (2005)); GERMAN ADAPTATION, supra note 22, at 
26. 
115
 See Adler, supra note 60, at 40.  That kind of hoarding may run afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause 
in any event.  See Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982) (striking down state effort to restrict exports 
of groundwater). 
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coordinating role undertaken by the federal government in preparing for and responding 
to climate change.116 
 
The NIMBY problem arises when states or localities adopt stringent 
environmental protection measures whose aim is force socially important activities that 
create environmental risks to locate elsewhere, because residents of the adopting 
jurisdiction can enjoy the economic benefits of the activity without sharing in the 
environmental risks.  Federal preemption is a way to preclude that kind of 
“overregulation.”  Although the extent to which this rationale for preemption applies in 
the context of climate change adaptation is also not clear, the NIMBY problem may have 
some relevance to adaptation.  Climate change is likely to produce environmental 
refugees as it makes certain areas of the world uninhabitable or inhospitable.117  
Individual states may seek to avoid an influx of immigrants who may put a strain on 
social services and infrastructure by adopting laws that restrict entry by or employment 
opportunities for immigrants.  The adoption in 2010 of Arizona’s controversial law 
making the failure to carry immigration documents a criminal offense118 illustrates the 
potential for states to take measures to keep out unwanted refugees.119  Congress may 
decide that it is desirable to preempt such tactics to prevent one state from foisting the 
burdens resulting from an influx of climate refugees on other states.120 
 
The final collective action justification for federal action is the prevention of 
transboundary externalities.  Typically, this problem involves inadequate regulatory 
action in one jurisdiction that fosters adverse effects in another.  As discussed above, this 
collective action problem justifies the establishment of a federal floor for climate change 
adaptation.  It also may justify, however, the creation of a federal ceiling or the adoption 
of preemptive measures designed to prevent excessive state adaptation that would be 
inconsistent with the national interest.  Suppose, for example, that a state decides to 
construct dams or reservoirs to abate water shortages linked to climate change.  Those 
facilities could diminish supplies downstream, alter aquatic ecosystems in ways that 
                                                 
116
 See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text. 
117
 See, e.g., Shuaizhang Feng et al., Linkages Among Climate Change, Crop Yields and Mexico-US Cross-
Border Migration, doi: 10.1073/pnas.1002632107 (2010), 
http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2010/07/16/1002632107 (describing impact of climate change on 
emigration to the United States from Mexico due to reductions in crop yields caused by rising 
temperatures). 
118
 Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, 2010 Ariz. Session laws, ch. 113. 
119
 A federal district court enjoined portions of the law from going into effect on the ground that they are 
likely preempted by federal law.  United States v. Arizona, ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, 2010 WL 2926157 (D. 
Ariz. July 28, 2010).   For further discussion of the Arizona legislation, see Randal C. Archibold, Arizona 
Enacts Stringent Law on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2010; Linda Greenhouse, Breathing While 
Undocumented, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2010.  See also Patrick S. Cunningham, Comment, The Legal 
Arizona Workers’ Act: A Threat to Federal Supremacy Over Immigration?, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 411 (2010) 
(considering whether earlier Arizona legislation that restricts employment of undocumented workers and 
other state employment laws that interact with federal immigration policy are preempted by federal law). 
120
 See Ruhl, supra note 13, at 55 (arguing that “[s]ome aspects of aspects of adaptation policy are 
inherently national in scope, such as immigration policy”).  Professor Ruhl lists several other such areas, 
including food supply safety, conservation of marine resources, and pandemic disease control.  Of these, 
pandemic disease control appears most likely to involve the NIMBY problem if, for example, a state or 
locality adopts quarantine laws or laws restricting movement of ill individuals. 
__ ENVTL. L. ___ (2011) (forthcoming) 
   
 
27
create adverse effects outside the jurisdiction, or block access to fish spawning grounds in 
upstream states.121  Similarly, the construction of canals to block salt water intrusion 
resulting from rising sea levels has the potential to produce wildlife habitat fragmentation 
and loss with adverse effects in other jurisdictions.122  A state or locality that decides to 
attack aggressively pests that proliferate as temperatures climb through the application of 
chemical pesticides may create water quality problems outside the jurisdiction if the 
chemicals find their way into surface water boundaries that cross political boundaries.123  
In such cases, action, not inaction, by the state or locality would be responsible for 
externalizing some of the adverse effects of climate change.  The appropriate federal 
response may be to preclude state or local measures that impair access to water or harm 
aquatic environments elsewhere. 
 
Preemption will not necessarily be the appropriate response every time state or 
local adaptation measures create interjurisdictional externalities.  Each state has a 
responsibility to protect its citizens from harm.  Further, as the aftermath of Hurricane 
Katrina demonstrated, it may be problematic to rely on the federal government to respond 
adequately to a problem whose effects are concentrated locally.  If the harm that an 
adaptation measure seeks to avert is concentrated in one or a few states, the other states 
may lack the incentive to contribute to or finance the remedy.124  In addition, the external 
costs that result from a state’s adaptation measure may be attenuated or difficult to 
measure, while the localized harm at which the measure is directed may be obvious and 
severe.  Finally, if a particular effort to prevent or minimize the adverse effects of climate 
change creates both positive and negative externalities in other states, the case for federal 
displacement may be relatively weak.125  It might be appropriate to require a strong 
threshold showing of a discrepancy between the cost-benefit balance for an individual 
state and the collective interest before triggering preemption, especially in areas in which 
there is a long tradition of state regulatory authority. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
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 The uncertainty about the magnitude and distribution of the effects of climate 
change makes it impossible to predict exactly what kinds of adaptive measures will be 
needed in different parts of the country and when they will be needed.  There seems to be 
a consensus among those who have focused on climate change adaptation policy that the 
effort will necessarily involve federal, state, and local government participation.  In an 
optimal world, policymakers at different levels would coordinate their responses so that 
adaptation proceeds as efficiently and effectively as possible, the burdens resulting from 
climate change are minimized, and the unavoidable burdens are distributed as equitably 
as possible, even though climate change is likely to affect some areas of the country (such 
as coastal areas vulnerable to flooding and severe storm activity) more than others. 
 
It is inevitable, however, that clashes of interest will develop between 
jurisdictions when desired goods (such as potable water) are scarce or efforts by one state 
or locality to avoid the undesirable aspects of climate change shift the burden of those 
changes to other jurisdictions.  Collective action analysis can help avoid or resolve such 
conflicts by assigning the authority to control the development of climate change 
adaptation policy to the level of government best situated to address a problem without 
exacerbating the adverse consequences of climate change for others.  The conflicts are 
likely to arise both when states and localities fail to do enough to anticipate and react to 
climate change and when they do “too much.”  As the analysis above indicates, collective 
action analysis supports the exercise of federal power to create minimal protections 
against the ravages of climate change in the face of state or local reluctance to react to its 
consequences.  The federal role, which would exist concurrently with the exercise of state 
and local power to respond to climate change, could involve providing technical and 
financial assistance to state and local governments or the creation of the kinds of 
cooperative federalism regulatory programs that have become entrenched in U.S. 
environmental law over the last forty years.  In limited contexts, collective action analysis 
also supports displacement of the aggressive exercise of state and local authority to adapt 
to climate change in favor of exclusive federal control.  These situations are most likely 
to involve state and local efforts that result in interstate externalities. 
